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Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a quantum-proof key-exchange scheme which is fast ap-
proaching the communication industry. An essential component in QKD is the information recon-
ciliation step, which is used for correcting the quantum-channel noise errors. The recently suggested
blind-reconciliation technique, based on low-density parity-check codes (LDPC), offers remarkable
prospectives for efficient information reconciliation without an a priori rate estimation. We sug-
gest an improvement of blind-information-reconciliation protocol promoting a significant increase
in the efficiency of the procedure and reducing its interactivity. The proposed technique is based
on introducing symmetry in operations of parties, and the consideration of results of unsuccessful
belief-propagation decodings.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is the art of dis-
tributing provably-secure cryptographic keys in an inse-
cure communications network [1–4]. Unlike conventional
cryptography, the security of QKD is based on the laws
of quantum physics and thus is guaranteed to be secure
against any unforeseen technological and algorithmic de-
velopments, e.g., quantum computing. For this reason,
QKD has attracted an enormous amount of interest since
its discovery, and is now one of the most widely studied
research field in quantum information science. In fact,
provably secure commercial QKD systems are now avail-
able at retail [5].
A QKD system is carried out in two consecutive
phases, namely, a quantum key establishment phase and
a classical postprocessing phase [6]. In the first phase, the
users first create an unprocessed (raw) key pair by per-
forming local measurements on quantum signals which
are exchanged via an untrusted quantum channel. At this
point, the pair of raw keys are weakly correlated—due
to noise in the quantum channel—and are partially se-
cure. To correct the errors and remove the adversary’s
information about the raw key pair, the users run an
information reconciliation step and a privacy amplifica-
tion step. The former requires the user to exchange a
certain amount of public information about the key pair,
which is then compensated for in the privacy amplifi-
cation step. Finally, after the classical post-processing
phase, the users are left with a correct and secure key
pair (for details, see Refs. [6–9]).
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It is clear that information reconciliation is an impor-
tant step in QKD, for it is necessary to correct the errors
introduced by the quantum channel (or the adversary).
In practice, the information reconciliation step is typi-
cally implemented using an iterative method known as
Cascade [10]. The Cascade method is based on the ran-
dom shuffling and the dichotomic search of discrepancies
based on announcements of sub-block parities via com-
munication over the authenticated channel. A number of
possible improvements have been proposed, but most of
them are very expensive in terms of communication [11].
That is, despite the fact that different sub-blocks can
be treated in parallel [12], the Cascade method is still a
highly interactive algorithm as the dichotomic search re-
quires multiple rounds of communication between users.
Interactivity of Cascade-based information reconcilia-
tion procedure can cost significant amount of authenti-
cation resources together with time delays and the work-
load in QKD systems. Another popular information rec-
onciliation scheme is forward error correction with LDPC
codes [13, 14], which uses a single message containing
a syndrome calculated for a particular block of a sifted
key [15–19]. However, this scheme could fail and penalize
the secret key throughput due to its inability to perform
the syndrome-decoding procedure. Such failures appear
if the syndrome decoding, based on an iterative belief-
propagation algorithm, does not converge in the prede-
fined number of iterations (e.g. it could be caused by
an inappropriate choice of the code rate relative to the
actual number of discrepancies in raw keys).
The problem with convergence differentiates the tradi-
tional LDPC code-based error correction methods [13, 14]
from the Cascade, where the dichotomic search is per-
formed as long as all of the sub-blocks in all of the shuf-
fling rounds contain odd numbers of errors. Then Cascade
can be considered as a guaranteed-convergence method
(see Fig. 1). It is important to note that guaranteed con-
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Figure 1. Comparison of three parameters (efficiency, typical number of communication rounds, and convergence guarantee) for
different approaches to information reconciliation for QKD systems: the cascade method [11], straightforward implementation
of LDPC codes [16], rate-adaptive implementation of LDPC codes [18], blind reconciliation implementation of LDPC codes [21],
and our proposed solution (symmetric blind information reconciliation). We note that the typical number of communication
rounds for blind and symmetric blind protocols is considered in the assumption that both the protocols are running until a
convergence of syndrome decoding.
vergence does not imply guaranteed reconciliation. In the
case of Cascade, some of sub-blocks still can contain pos-
itive numbers of undetected errors after implementation
of the reconciliation procedure [11]. The analogous prob-
lem remains for all the LDPC-code-based reconciliation
protocols, where belief-propagation decoding sometimes
can converge to an inappropriate codeword. In order to
solve this problem, an additional step of verification with
universal hashing is usually considered [8, 20].
Therefore, an important task for optimizing the work-
flow of QKD is to provide a regime with guaranteed con-
vergence of the information reconciliation scheme, but
without significant expenditure of authentication and
time resources. This can be achieved by combining the
key advantages of the aforementioned schemes and by
introducing some interactivity into error correction with
LDPC codes. This technique is known as blind informa-
tion reconciliation [18, 21, 22] and can operate without
an a priori estimation of the quantum bit error rate
(QBER).
In this work, we demonstrate further improvements of
error correction combining LDPC codes and interactivity.
We show that the use of interactivity — by introducing
symmetry in operations of parties and the consideration
of results of unsuccessful belief-propagation decodings —
allows one to perform an efficient and convergence guar-
anteed information reconciliation procedure. For practi-
cal QKD parameters, simulation results show an average
of about 10% improvement in efficiency and an average
of about 30% improvement in the number of information
requests. We refer to our proposed method as the sym-
metric blind information reconciliation. For a compari-
son of the proposed information reconciliation procedure
with existing solutions, see Fig. 1.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we explain
concepts of the information reconciliation procedure. In
Sec. III, we present an improvement of blind informa-
tion reconciliation with LDPC codes. We summarize our
results and consider an illustrative example in Sec. IV.
II. BASIC CONCEPTS OF ERROR
CORRECTION
The goal of the information reconciliation procedure is
to correct the errors between Alice’s and Bob’s raw keys
by disclosing some key information over a public (authen-
ticated) channel. Each bit value of the Bob’s string is a
result of a transmission of the corresponding bit from
the Alice’s string through a binary symmetric channel
(BSC). The crossover probability q of the channel is also
known as the QBER.
One of the ways to perform error correction is to use
a LDPC code which is a linear code with a sparse m× n
binary parity-check matrix [13, 14]. Alice multiplies the
parity-check matrix by a block of the raw key of length
n to obtain a syndrome of length m, which is then sent
to Bob. Then, Bob performs a syndrome-decoding opera-
tion on his side using his raw key, the same sparse matrix,
and an estimated level of QBER, which comes from the
preceding procedures.
In the best-case scenario, the syndrome-decoding pro-
cedure outputs the same key as is on Alice’s side. Never-
theless, there is still a probability of an undetected frame
error. To ensure that the error-correction procedure is
performed properly, an additional stage of error verifica-
tion is applied [8, 20]. It can be done using a universal
hashing technique [23, 24], which guarantees correctness
with a probability depending on the length of the hash
code. There is also a possibility that the syndrome de-
coding based on belief-propagation procedure does not
converge in the specified number of iterations. Then the
3parties have to discard the processed blocks of the raw
key and go to the next ones.
An important figure of merit for a reconciliation pro-
tocol is its efficiency f . It is given by the redundancy
of disclosed information to the theoretical limit neces-
sary for successful reconciliation [25]. For a given BSC
it is characterized by the Shannon binary entropy of the
QBER [26]:
hb(q) = −q log2 q − (1− q) log2(1− q). (1)
Thus, the efficiency of the considered information recon-
ciliation with LDPC code can be represented as
f =
m
nhb(q)
=
1−R
hb(q)
, (2)
where R = 1 −m/n is the rate of a given LDPC code.
The importance of the efficiency f is based on the fact
that the value of disclosed information has to be removed
from the key in the stage of privacy amplification. We
also note that the efficiency larger than unity does not
guarantee successful decoding. In fact, it depends on
the specific parity-check matrix, the maximal number of
iteration in decoding procedure and other factors.
A. Rate-adaptive scheme
The straightforward implementation of the LDPC er-
ror correction suffers from the following drawback. The
efficiency parameter f is fixed by the dimension of the
parity-check matrix and the current level of the QBER,
according to Eq. (2). A naive way to perform information
reconciliation with the desired efficiency is to choose or
construct another parity-check matrix with a new rate,
i.e., an m/n ratio.
Two elegant ways known as shortening and punctur-
ing have been proposed to adjust the rate of the LDPC
code to the desirable efficiency by modification of encod-
ing and decoding vectors rather than through the parity
check matrix [18, 19]. The main idea is to perform syn-
drome coding and decoding with extended keys of length
n obtained from the original raw keys of length n−s−p by
padding them with s shortened and p punctured bits. The
shortened symbols are the ones which have values exactly
known by Alice and Bob, as well as by the adversary. The
values of punctured bits come from true random number
generators (TRNGs), independently of the both sides.
In this way, the shortened (punctured) bits serve for low-
ering (raising) the average discrepancy between the ex-
tended keys. The positions for shortened and punctured
bits could be chosen using a synchronized pseudo-random
number generator (PRNG), or depending on a particu-
lar parity-check matrix (for example, via the untainted-
puncturing method [27]).
After the construction of the extended keys, the par-
ties perform information reconciliation in the same way
as discussed above. The difference is that in the case of
a successful decoding, Bob excludes shortened and punc-
tured bits from the result of the decoding procedure to
obtain a corrected version of his raw key. The efficiency
of the described scheme is defined in the following form:
f =
m− p
[n− p− s]hb(q) . (3)
Thus, the artificial reduction (increase) of discrepancies
between extended keys by shortened (punctured) bits al-
lows one to implement fine-tuning of efficiency in order
to keep a trade-off between a probability of failure for
belief-propagation decoding and information leakage.
B. Blind reconciliation
The above scheme implies a single message sent from
Alice to Bob only. This is a crucial advantage over the
cascading method, which is highly interactive [11]. How-
ever, the cascading method demonstrates rather good
efficiency, particularly at low values of the QBER [11,
16]. Also, cascade methods do not suffer from the inabil-
ity to perform the error correction, i.e., it always con-
verges to some result. Therefore, the cascading method
is widely used as an important benchmark for comparison
of information reconciliation protocols [22].
To combine “the best of both worlds” by linking in-
teractivity with the LDPC codes, a blind information
reconciliation technique was suggested [18, 21, 22]. Its
title comes from the fact that it can operate without an
a priori estimation of the QBER (a rough estimation of
the QBER for the belief-propagation decoding one can
be obtained directly from the syndromes [28]). Blind
reconciliation is based on the hybrid automatic repeat
request technique [29] with the LDPC codes with an es-
sential presence of punctured symbols. The crucial dif-
ference is that, in the case of a decoding failure, parties
try to implement the decoding procedure again by turn-
ing a number of punctured symbols into shortened ones
instead of discarding their blocks. The values of these
bits are transferred via the classical channel after a cor-
responding request of Bob. Once the punctured bits are
exhausted it is possible to continue revealing additional
information with sifted key bits. The efficiency of the
procedure after nadd number of additional communica-
tion rounds is given by [21]
f =
m− p0 + naddd
[n− p0 − s0]hb(q) , (4)
where s0 and p0 are the initial numbers of punctured and
shortened bits, and d is the number of disclosed bits in
each additional round of blind reconciliation. The mean-
ing of expression (4) relative to with expression (3) is as
follows: if the decoding procedure according to the rate-
adaptive scheme with efficiency (3) does not converge,
then the parties increase f in each additional communi-
cation round of the blind reconciliation to increase the
probability of convergence.
4The main advantage of blind reconciliation over the
rate-adaptive scheme is that it allows one to adjust the
efficiency to the actual error ratio, which can significantly
fluctuate around the average QBER. In Refs. [21, 22] it
was shown that the gradual disclosing of information can
notably lower the mean value of f together with frame
error rate (FER). These are benefits obtained at the price
of introducing additional interactivity (see Fig. 1).
III. SYMMETRIC BLIND RECONCILIATION
We suggest an improvement of blind information rec-
onciliation with LDPC codes. The proposed technique
allows one to overcome the drawbacks of the aforemen-
tioned information reconciliation schemes by providing
guaranteed belief propagation-based decoding with de-
creased information leakage and a decreased number of
communication rounds. Our approach is based on ap-
plying information reconciliation with LDPC codes in a
symmetric way. Specifically, it consists of the following
general steps (a detailed description of the procedure is
given in Methods). First, in analogy to the rate-adaptive
scheme, the parties choose the numbers and positions of
the shortened and punctured bits and extend their blocks
of raw keys. Second, both Alice and Bob compute the
syndrome of their extended raw keys and share them with
each other. Then they perform belief-propagation decod-
ing. In a successful case, one party — say Bob — corrects
the errors, and the procedure proceeds to the verification
stage. In failed case, the parties exchange the values of a
fixed number of bits having maximal uncertainty accord-
ing to the log-likelihood ratio (LLR). After that, Alice
and Bob repeat the belief-propagation decoding proce-
dure with the updated list of shortened and punctured
positions. In this respect, the proposed symmetric blind
reconciliation is similar to the standard blind reconcilia-
tion. The alternative ingredient is that the positions of
additionally disclosed bits come not from the punctured
positions but are decidedly indicated by an unsuccess-
ful belief-propagation decoding algorithm. This removes
the restrictions on a number of additionally disclosed bits
and also makes it possible to perform interactive LDPC
code-based reconciliation even in the absence of punc-
tured bits. The latter scenario allows the adjustment of
current sets of LDPC codes to a broad range of QBER
values (see Appendix A). We also note that, in contrast
to the standard blind reconciliation protocol, where the
parties use two consecutive messages in each of the com-
munication rounds (the request and the corresponding
answer), in the symmetric blind reconciliation the mes-
sages between parties are transferred simultaneously.
The convergence of the proposed method is formally
guaranteed by the fact that, in the worst-case scenario,
the parties reveal the entire extended key. Clearly, in this
case, the block will be useless for the secret key distilla-
tion. In practice, the convergence takes place after a rela-
tively small number of additional communication rounds.
The efficiency of the suggested method as of blind recon-
ciliation is given by Eq. (4).
The security analysis for rate-adaptive information rec-
onciliation was considered in detail in Ref. [32]. It turns
out that the symmetric blind reconciliation due to its in-
herent symmetry has a lot in common with the Cascade
method, and the security analysis, developed for a class
of adaptive symmetric error-correction methods (includ-
ing the Cascade method) given in Ref. [31], is applicable
to our proposed scheme as well. We refer the reader to
Appendix C for details.
In order to demonstrate the improvements on the ef-
ficiency of the information reconciliation procedure, we
perform a numerical simulation. Specifically, we compare
the proposed procedure to the standard blind reconcilia-
tion, as in the most progressive LDPC based method for
information reconciliation in the QKD systems. We use
a set of four standard LDPC codes [33] with the rates
R = {5/6, 3/4, 2/3, 1/2}, (5)
with the block length fixed to n = 1944. For each of these
codes, we obtain a list of bit positions according to the
untainted-puncturing technique [27] containing pmax =
154, 221, 295 and 433 symbols, respectively. These codes
are currently used in industrial QKD systems [8, 9].
We simulate standard blind and symmetric blind rec-
onciliation procedures with the absence of initially short-
ened bits and pmax initially punctured bits for a range of
QBER values from 1% up to 10.5% (typical range for
BB84 implementations). In addition, we fix the FER to
less than 10%.
The number of bits to be disclosed in each additional
round of the procedure is chosen according to a particular
code rate R and the heuristic expression
d(R) = dn · (0.0280− 0.02R) · αe, (6)
where n is the block length, α is the auxiliary parameter,
and d. . . e is the standard ceiling operation. This expres-
sion was constructed in order to keep the mean number of
additional communication rounds approximately on the
same level for all the considered values of the QBER. The
larger the value of the parameter α, the wider the step
over the possible values of the efficiency f , for which the
syndrome decoding process is tried [see Eq. (4)], and the
lower the number of iterations are required to perform
reconciliation. The pay for a small amount of commu-
nication rounds is that the resulting value of f becomes
higher, than in the case with a shorter step d. Therefore,
the parameter α allows us to realize a trade-off between
the mean number of additional communication rounds
and the mean efficiency of the information reconciliation.
The simulation results for α = 1 and 0.5 are presented
in Fig. 2. First, one can see that symmetric reconciliation
improves both efficiencies f . This comes from the fact
that the decoding procedure in the symmetric scheme has
a faster convergence rate. Moreover, it requires a smaller
number of additional communication rounds.
5From these data, we identify an average of 10% im-
provement in the efficiency (10.4% for α = 1, and 11.4%
for α = 0.5) and an average of 30% improvement in the
number of information requests (28% for α = 1, and
33% for α = 0.5). Moreover, the scheme does not suffer
from the frame errors coming from unsuccessful belief-
propagation decodings.
Next, we compare two sets of codes in the rate-adaptive
regime under the assumption that the level of the QBER
is known. The first set of codes is the previously con-
sidered one with rates (5) and block length fixed to
n = 1944. The second set of codes has rates in the range
R′ = {0.5, 0.55, . . . , 0.9} (7)
with the block length fixed to n=4000. It is con-
structed with the use of the improved edge-growth algo-
rithm [30] with the degree distribution polynomials given
by Ref. [16]. The initial numbers of shortened and punc-
tured bits are chosen to obtain initial decoding efficiency
fstart = 1 (see Appendix B). For each code we also con-
struct a set of untainted-puncturing positions [27] and
use them if possible.
The results of simulation for two sets of codes and two
values of α (0.5 and 1) are presented in Fig. 3. It is clearly
seen that the use of codes with block length n = 1944
and α = 0.5 gives roughly the same efficiency as the
codes with the block length n = 4000 and α = 1. This
observation suggests that the symmetric blind reconcilia-
tion procedure is able to perform a trade-off between the
number of required communication rounds and informa-
tion leakage.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose an approach which signifi-
cantly improves the blind information reconciliation tech-
nique — the most progressive LDPC codes-based method
for information reconciliation in the QKD systems. The
gain comes from employing information from unsuccess-
ful decodings and making the whole information recon-
ciliation process in a symmetric form.
Specifically, propose disclosing a number of bits with
the positions corresponding to maximal uncertainty of
the values upon finishing the decoding procedure rather
than certain bits in the punctured positions. We note
that the shortcoming of the presented method is that it
occupies computational resources on the both sides and
make it impossible to parallelize two opposite one-way
information reconciliation processes. The ability of sym-
metric blind reconciliation to obtain rather low values of
efficiency with short-length codes is expected to realize
an efficient throughput with hardware-implemented syn-
drome decoding.
We note that short-length LDPC codes have been used
to show the results of our method. The fact is that a
small block length leads to high fluctuations in the actual
number of discrepancies in raw keys even in the case of
a constant QBER. In turn, these fluctuations are crucial
for successful belief-propagation decoding. The feature
of blind reconciliation is that it can treat fluctuations by
disclosing an adequate amount of information via public
channel.
The suggested method of information reconciliation
can essentially be used for LDPC codes with large block
lengths (say, 104 or 105). In the case of an adjustment to
a proper level of initial efficiency, it can be used for the
complete elimination of belief-propagation decoding fail-
ures via a relatively rare request of additional bit values.
Nevertheless, these requests could appear to be very use-
ful in the case of fluctuations of the QBER and especially
in the case where error estimation is performed after the
error correction (similar to that in Ref. [8]).
In order to evaluate the performance of our proposed
scheme in the context of industrial QKD systems, we
consider an illustrative example based on the results of
Ref. [8]. In this particular setup, the information rec-
onciliation was performed with a straightforward imple-
mentation of the standard n = 1944 LDPC code [33] with
R = 3/4 using QBER q ≈ 1.9%. According to the re-
sults presented in Fig. 3, an implementation of symmetric
blind reconciliation may lead to a decrease of efficiency
down to f ≈ 1.3 with approximately six additional com-
munication rounds. It provides a 10% increase in the
secure key rate (we note that Cascade implementation
of the information reconciliation procedure in the same
conditions requires about 50 communication rounds [11]).
Moreover, in this QKD system, an estimated level of
QBER is calculated via the comparison of a number
of key blocks before and after error correction (unver-
ified blocks are conservatively assumed to have a 50%
error rate). Verification errors, resulting from unsuc-
cessful belief-propagation decodings and convergences to
improper vectors, leading to an overly pessimistic esti-
mation of the QBER: qest ≈ 3.4%. Thus, the suggested
approach opens a way for QBER estimation in a more
accurate way along with a more economical utilization of
generated raw keys.
Our source code for a proof-of-principle realization of
the symmetric blind information reconciliation procedure
for Python 2.7 is freely available under the GNU general
public license (GPL) [34]. A proof-of-principle realization
of the suggested post-processing procedure is also avail-
able [35].
Finally we would like to emphasize that in the current
contribution we conside the information ordering, inher-
ent in the QKD scheme: (i) the sifted quantum keys
are generated using consistent preparation and measure-
ments of events, (ii) the information reconciliation for re-
moving discrepancies in the sifted keys is applied, (iii) the
privacy amplification, based on the estimated quantum-
channel parameters and information leakage in the in-
formation reconciliation step, is performed for obtaining
the pair of secret identical keys. Then, this pair of keys
can be used for information-theoretically secure informa-
tion transfer with one-time pad encryption (Vernam ci-
6Moderate number of additionaly disclosed bits in each round (α = 1 ) Diminished number of additionaly disclosed bits in each round  (α  = 0.5 )
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
R = 5/6, blind
R = 5/6, symmetric
R = 3/4, blind
R = 3/4, symmetric
R = 2/3, blind
R = 2/3, symmetric
R = 1/2, blind
R = 1/2, symmetric
Figure 2. Comparison of the standard blind and symmetric blind information reconciliation protocols for two modes of
disclosed bit number calculation (6): α = 1 (left column) and α = 0.5 (right column). Thin lines and empty symbols
stand for blind information reconciliation, bold lines and filled symbols stand for the suggested approach (symmetric blind
information reconciliation). In (a) and (b) the efficiencies, i.e. ratios of disclosed information to theoretical limit, are shown as
functions of the QBER for the four standard LDPC codes [33] with block length n = 1944. In (c) and (d) the mean numbers of
communication rounds are shown as function of the QBER. Changes of the codes (corresponding to different R) were performed
according to the requirement that the probability of convergence for the blind reconciliation using only the punctured bits is
larger than 90%. The convergence probability for the symmetric blind reconciliation is always 100%
(a)
(b)
Figure 3. In (a) the efficiency of rate-adaptive symmetric blind reconciliation for two sets of codes and two modes of disclosed
bit number is shown as a function of QBER. In (b) mean numbers of additional communication round of rate-adaptive symmetric
blind reconciliation for two sets of codes and two modes of disclosed bit number is shown as function of QBER. The first set
of codes is the standard one with block length n = 1944 [33] and the second set of codes consists of nine codes with rates (7)
and block length n = 4000. The disclosed bit number chose according to (6) with α = 1 (moderate) and α = 0.5 (diminished).
7pher) or other applications [37]. The above scheme differs
from the another important protocol of quantum cryp-
tography, namely quantum secure direct communication
(QSDC), where the information is directly transmitted
through the quantum channel without a preliminary key
generation stage (e.g. see Ref. [38] for the first theoret-
ical proposal, and Ref. [39, 40] for recent experimental
demonstrations). In the case of QSDC, there is also a
need in the error correction, but usually it is more ap-
propriate to perform it by means of some noisy-channel
coding techniques: that is, by adding redundancy to the
transmitting message, rather than by employing public
discussion after the message has been transmitted.
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APPENDIX A: WORKFLOW OF THE
SYMMETRIC BLIND RECONCILIATION
Here, we give a detailed description of the workflow of
the proposed symmetric blind reconciliation. The general
scheme is presented in Fig. 4(a).
First, we assume that Alice and Bob have an estimated
value of QBER qest, which comes from the preceding er-
ror estimation step or previous rounds of post-processing
procedure. Parties start with choosing the optimal code
from a set (pool) of available LDPC codes according to
qest and desired starting efficiency fstart (in all of our
discussions, it is set to unity). For each code, specified
by its m × n parity matrix H (with m < n), parties
calculate the number of shortened (s) or punctured (p)
symbols that is required to obtain desired efficiency fstart
from the nonadaptable efficiency f0 = m/ [n hb(qest)] as
follows:
p = b(m− nhb(qest)fstart)/(1− hb(qest)fstart)c,
s = 0
(A1)
for f0 > fstart, and
s = dn−m/hb(qest)fstarte,
p = 0
(A2)
for f0 < fstart.
The particular code among the set is then chosen in
such a way that it has the maximal number of raw key
bits in the extended key. We note that, in our approach,
we use only shortened or punctured bits to obtain the de-
sired efficiency fstart [see also Fig. 4(b)]. This method is
quite different from the commonly used approach [18, 19],
where the sum of the numbers of shortened and punc-
tured bits remains constant.
Then the parties take blocks of their raw keys x and
y of length n − p − s and pad them with shortened and
punctured symbols obtaining extended keys xext and yext
of code block length n. In Fig. 4(a) we denote this op-
eration as E(·, S, P ), where S and P are lists of posi-
tions for shortened and punctured symbols of length s
and p, respectively. If it is possible, parties choose P us-
ing position from special list, generated in advance with
untainted puncturing technique [27]. Otherwise, the par-
ties choose P as well as S with a synchronized PRNG. All
shortened symbols obtains zero values, while the values
of the punctured bits come from the TRNG (indepen-
dently on each side). The party that modifies its raw
key (in our case it is Bob) also keeps original positions of
shortened and punctured symbols as S0 and P0. These
position are used in the final stage of the procedure.
The subsequent part of the procedure aims at recon-
struction of a vector edec, which we call an error pattern,
such that
xext = yext + edec (mod 2). (A3)
In order to cope with this task, both Alice and Bob ini-
tialize the supposed error pattern e as the zero vector,
calculate the syndromes sx and sy of their extended keys
xext and yext, and share the obtained syndromes with
each other. Then each party performs belief-propagation
decoding with the relative syndrome
s = sx + sy (mod 2). (A4)
We use an updated belief-propagation decoding algo-
rithm (see below), which returns not only a resulting de-
coded vector edec (that is “none” in the failure case), but
also a set of bit positions D of a fixed length d which
have the lowest LLR upon completion of the decoding.
In other words, the updated decoding procedure returns
d positions of symbols with the most uncertainty in their
values.
Owing to the fact that both parties perform the same
operation, they obtain the same output edec and D. In
the case of a failure (edec = none), the parties share the
values of bits in the positions of D, update their sup-
posed error pattern e in the positions from D according
to received values,
e[D] = xext[D] + yext[D] (mod 2), (A5)
and try to perform the decoding process again by mark-
ing positions in D as shortened, which is crucial for the
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Figure 4. (a) The block scheme of a symmetric blind-reconciliation-procedure workflow is presented. Note that all summations
are assumed to be performed by modulo 2. (b) Visual representation of choosing numbers for shortened and punctured symbols
in an extending key according to an estimated level of QBER for a particular code is shown. (c) The correspondence between
parity-check matrix and the bipartite Tanner graph is presented. (d),(e) The principles of construction of messages from check
node to symbol node and symbol node to check node are shown.
subsequent decoding procedure. This sequence of opera-
tions is repeated until a convergence of belief-propagation
decoding. Then Bob applies error correction according
to the obtained error pattern edec by modulo 2 summa-
tion with his extended key y. Finally, Bob excludes the
symbols with initially shortened S0 and punctured P0 po-
sitions to obtain the corrected key xdec [we denote this
operation E−1 in Fig. 4(a)], and parties move to the ver-
ification step with the original raw key x on Alice’s side
and its corrected version xdec on Bob’s one.
APPENDIX B: BELIEF PROPAGATION
DECODING
We use a belief-propagation sum-product algo-
rithm [14] based one the use of LLRs, with some updates
necessary for our implementation. For a given random
bit variable X, its LLR is defined as
LLR(X) ≡ log Prob(X = 0)
Prob(X = 1)
. (B1)
One can see that the sign of LLR corresponds to the most
likely value ofX (0 for a positive LLR and 1 for a negative
one), and its absolute value exhibits the confidence level
of this particular value.
The decoding algorithm is based on the representa-
tion of parity-check matrix H in the bipartite graph [see
Fig. 4(c)]. It consists of n symbol nodes and m check
nodes that corresponds to rows and columns of parity-
check matrix H. The i-th symbol node is connected by
edge with the j-th check node if and only if the cor-
responding element of parity-check matrix is nonzero:
H[i, j] = 1. Process of a decoding can be described as an
exchange of messages about the symbol nodes.
9We consider the decoding procedure as follows:
edec, D := decode(s, e,H, qest, S, P ), (B2)
where s is the syndrome, e is the vector of length n that
has to be corrected, H is the m × n parity-check ma-
trix, qest is the estimated level of crossover probability
(QBER), S and P are positions of shortened and punc-
tured bits, edec is the corrected version of e, and D is
the list of positions for d symbols with the lowest LLR
values, where d is considered as an external constant.
The workflow of the procedure is as follows. We with a
calculation of the initial LLRs for all symbol nodes. The
corresponding vector is denoted as r(0) and its elements
are given by
r(0)[i] :=

(−1)e[i]rk, i ∈ K
(−1)e[i]rs, i ∈ S
0, i ∈ P
, (B3)
where K consists of raw key positions, such that
K ∪ S ∪ P = {1, 2, . . . , n}. (B4)
Here, rk is calculated using an estimated value of QBER,
est:
rk = log
1− qest
qest
. (B5)
The LLR value for shortened symbols rs  1 and, in
our implementation, we use rs := 100. The LLR for
punctured symbols is zero, as there is no information
about their values since they come from an independent
true RNG
The initial messages from check nodes to symbol nodes
are given by the initial values of corresponding LLRs as
follows:
M
(1)
i→j := r
(0)[i]. (B6)
Here i ∈ N and j ∈ Ai, where Ai is a set of symbol nodes
connected to the i-th symbol node.
Check nodes from messages back to the symbol node
are realized in the following way:
M
(k)
i←j := 2 tanh
−1
 ∏
i′∈Bj/i
M
(k)
i′→j
2
 (−1)s[j], (B7)
where j ∈ M ≡ {1, 2, . . . ,m} and i ∈ Bj , with Bj being
a set of symbol nodes connected to the j-th check node.
We note that Mi←j does not take into account Mi→j .
Actually Mi←j is the LLR of the i-th bit value based
on satisfying the parity equation of the j-th row of the
parity-check matrix H, and the LLRs of all other symbol
nodes taking part in this equation [see Fig. 4(d)].
The symbol node updates its LLR using all of the mes-
sages coming from its check nodes:
r(k)[i] := r(0)[i] +
∑
j∈Ai
M
(k)
i←j (B8)
and it calculates current estimates for the bit values,
z(k)[i] :=
{
0, r(k)[i] ≥ 0
1, r(k)[i] < 0
. (B9)
If this estimate satisfies all parity equations,
Hz(k) = s (mod 2), (B10)
then the algorithm stops and returns the decoded vector
z
As a stopping criterion, we consider behavior of aver-
aged magnitude LLRs for symbols in nonshortened posi-
tions:
rˆ(k) :=
1
n− s
∑
i∈K∪P
|r(k)[i]|. (B11)
We stop the decoding and return “none” as the decoded
vector if, for the current step k, the following inequality
holds:
rˆ(k) ≤ 1N
k−1∑
j=k−N
rˆ(j), (B12)
where we use N := 5. It can be interpreted as the end of
a growth trend as far as our confidence in bit values. The
algorithm also returns a D that is a list of d positions of
symbols which has minimal values of LLR magnitude
D = {i | |r(k)[i]| ≤ |r(k)[j]| ∀j /∈ D}, |D| = d. (B13)
Otherwise, the algorithm goes to the next step.
According to the new LLRs, we update the messages
from the symbol nodes to the check nodes:
M
(k+1)
i→j := r
(0)[i] +
∑
j′∈Ai/j
M
(k)
i←j′
= r(k)[i]−M(k)i←j
(B14)
where the counter of iterations is incremented, k := k+1
[see Fig. 4(e)], and the algorithm goes to the step with
check nodes from messages back to symbol node [see Eq.
(B8)].
It is important to note that the most computationally
expensive calculation (B7) can be optimized by using a
technique suggested in Ref. [36]. We also point out that
Eq. (B7) reveals some peculiarity regarding punctured
symbols. A zero LLR of the punctured symbol i ∈ Bj
on the first step “deactivates” the jth check node mak-
ing all messages Mi′←j (i′ ∈ Bj , i′ 6= i) to other symbol
nodes to be zero. If there are no punctured bits in Bj/i,
then |Mi←j | > 0, and the ith node is “rescued” after
the first iteration and then participates in the decoding
procedure. However, if there are at least two punctured
nodes connected to a given jth check node, then all mes-
sages Mi←j , i ∈ Bj are zero. There still a possibility
that the punctures symbols will be ’rescued’ via another
check nodes, but such behavior nonetheless indicates the
importance of choosing a set of punctured symbols. To
avoid this situation the special technique of untainted
puncturing is used [27].
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APPENDIX C: SECURITY OF SYMMETRIC
BLIND RECONCILIATION
Here we consider a security issue of the presented
symmetric blind reconciliation protocol. Specifically, we
show that the amount of information leakage have to be
taken into account in the privacy amplification step in
accordance with Eq.(4) is given by
leakec = m− p0 + nadd d, (C1)
where recall m is the syndrome length, p0 is the initial
number of punctured symbols, nadd is the number of ad-
ditional communication rounds, and d is the number of
bits disclosed in each of these rounds.
During the symmetric blind reconciliation Alice and
Bob exchange
L = 2(m+ nadd d) (C2)
bits of information: each party transfers an m-bit syn-
drome and nadd d bits in additional communication
rounds. Obviously, the information leakage could not be
larger than L. Nevertheless, the actual leakage turns out
to be lower (and given by Eq.(C1)) for two reasons. First
is that the p0 punctured symbols due to their inherent
uncertainty decrease the leakage from each of the syn-
dromes from m to m− p0; and second is that the factor
2 in (C2) could be omitted due to the fact that each pair
of parity bits (one transferring from Alice to Bob, and
the other – in the opposite direction) can bring only one
bit of valuable information to the eavesdropper. Next,
we would like to focus on these two points.
Let us consider a symmetric blind reconciliation pro-
tocol for m × n parity-check matrix, (n − s0 − p0)-bit
sifted keys, s0 shortened, and p0 punctured bits. Re-
call that the punctured symbols are the bits with values
coming from independent TRNGs on both sides. The
consideration of the puncturing technique is greatly sim-
plified in untainted puncturing [27], which is employed
in our scheme. In the untainted puncturing, each of the
check nodes of the Tanner graph (corresponding the em-
ployed parity-check matrix) is connected with, at most,
one punctured symbol. This implies that it is possible to
split al ofl the syndrome bits’ positions {1, 2, . . . ,m} into
the subsets F and F where F contains p0 check nodes
indices of those which are connected with the punctured
bits, and the subset F ≡ {1, 2, . . . ,m}/F contains all of
the remaining syndrome-bit positions. Since each of the
syndrome-bit values sx[F ] and sy[F ] is obtained as the
result of a modulo-2 summation of nonpunctured symbols
and a single punctured bit (which is completely random
at each side), the disclosure of sx[F ] and sy[F ] in the
public channel does not bring any valuable information
to the eavesdropper. One can imagine that bits of sx[F ]
and sy[F ] are transferred separately from all other public
communications that is considered further. Thus, the in-
formation leakage does not exceed 2(m−p0+nadd d) bits.
We wish to remark that the case of random puncturing,
where the positions for punctured symbols are chosen
with synchronised PRNGs, could be treated in a simi-
lar way, but in this case an additional information about
the Tanner graph construction method has to be taken
into account. One has to show that it is always possible
to choose p0 syndrome bits whose values are statistically
independent from the n − p0 values of symbols that are
not punctured.
The second statement about the factor 2 in Eq. (C2) is
closely related to a similar question regarding to the one
of the first information reconciliation protocols – Cas-
cade [10], where Alice and Bob also exchange with parity
bits of some blocks of their keys in a symmetrical way.
A rigorous examination of this question related to the
BB84 protocol is considered by H.-K. Lo in Ref. [31]. In
his work Lo considers the adaptive symmetric method for
error correction (which we will refer to simply as adaptive
symmetric error correction) — the generalized informa-
tion reconciliation protocol which includes Cascade and
the symmetric blind reconciliation. Next, we provide its
definition.
Definition (adapted from Ref. [31]). Adaptive sym-
metric error correction is an iterative procedure applied
to Alice’s n-bit string x and Bob’s n-bit string y (which is
a corrupted version of x). where the rounds of operations
given below are performed.
• Round 1. Alice picks an n-bit string a1, and broad-
casts a1 and the parity px,1 = a1 · x (mod 2).
Bob broadcasts the parity py,1 = a1 · y (mod 2).
Alice and Bob compute the relative parity r1 =
py,1 − px,1 (mod 2).
• Round i (i > 1). Alice picks an i-bit string ai,
where the choice of ai may depend on the strings
{aj |j < i} and the relative parities {rj |j < i} (but
not on the individual parities, {px,j |j < i} and
{py,j |j < i}). Then Alice broadcasts ai and the
parity px,i = ai · x (mod 2). Bob broadcasts the
parity py,i = ai ·y (mod 2). Alice and Bob compute
the relative parity ri = py,1 − px,1 (mod 2).
After some number N of necessary rounds, Bob corrects
the errors in his string y by applying a recovery operator
z := Recover(y, {ri}Ni=1). (C3)
Ideally, z = x and Alice and Bob will now share the same
string x.
One can see that, in the described protocol, Alice and
Bob exchange with 2N bits of information: N bits goes
from Alice to Bob, and N bits – in the opposite direction.
In Ref. [31] it was proven that the procedure of adaptive
symmetric error correction is secure for purposes of the
BB84 QKD protocol in the case where both parity bits
px,i and py,i are both one-time pad encrypted with the
same secret bit. That is, Alice and Bob exchange with
the messages px,i+w[i] (mod 2) and py,i+w[i] (mod 2),
where w is an n-bit string of the secret key possessed by
Alice and Bob. From an overall key generation balance
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point of view, this scenario is equivalent to the situation,
where the information leakage in the adaptive symmetric
error correction is equal to N .
Now we return to the symmetric blind reconcilia-
tion. As it was shown, the communication of sx[F ] and
sy[F ] can be considered separately since none of these
bits bring any valuable information to the eavesdropper.
The exchange of the remaining syndrome bits sx[F ] and
sy[F ], can be regarded as the first m− p0 rounds of the
adaptive symmetric error correction: for each syndrome
bit, the string ai from the definition is the corresponding
row of the employed parity-check matrix. The syndrome
decoding algorithm (B2) either converges and allows Bob
to perform a recovery of x or returns a set of positions
D for the new communication round. Note that the set
D is obtained as a result of the syndrome decoding exe-
cuted for the relative syndrome s. By its definition [see
Eq. (A4)], the relative syndrome consists of relative par-
ities; therefore the choice of positions for the set D is
in agreement with the definition of adaptive symmetric
error correction. Each of the additional communication
rounds of the symmetric blind reconciliation with respect
to the set D, can be regarded as |D| = d of communica-
tion rounds in the definition of the adaptive symmetric
error correction. Namely, the string ai has all zeros ex-
cept for a single one at the position Dj (here, i is the
number of the round in the general sequence, and j is
the index of the element inside the set D of length d).
Thus, the completion of the symmetric blind recon-
ciliation with nadd additional rounds corresponds to the
adaptive symmetric error correction with N = m− p0 +
naddd rounds, and the information leakage given by ex-
pression (C1).
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